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Introduction
Although most leading politicians and financial regulators 
failed miserably to anticipate the banking crisis, EU leaders 
displayed  surprising  urgency  and  unity  in  reacting  to 
the  unfolding  global  economic  crisis. They  unveiled  the 
European  Economic  Recovery  Plan  back  in  late  2008, 
designed to coordinate actions in the individual Member 
States – primarily by way of a fiscal stimulus in each country 
– and to take common action at the EU level, where it was 
deemed to be prudent and workable. 
  Amongst  the  contributions  to  the  Recovery  Plan  is 
that from Cohesion Policy. This article briefly reviews the 
impact  of  the  economic  crisis  on  the  EU  and  examines 
the  initiatives  taken  within  the  field  of  Cohesion  Policy 
–  measures  to  simplify  the  Structural  Funds  regulations 
and accelerate spending on the ground. It concludes by 
considering the special merits of the policy and showing 
why it has been a useful tool at the heart of EU activity. 
The impact of the economic crisis
Declining output, rising unemployment
While  news  headlines  in  2010  have  been  dominated  by 
the state of public finances in Greece, Ireland, the United   
Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy and beyond, the reality of the 
recession is very painful indeed for workers losing their jobs 
and maybe their homes, for businesses struggling to survive, 
and for failed businesses. Declining national output (usually 
measured by gross domestic product, or GDP) means fewer 
jobs, fewer businesses, lower average incomes, more hardship 
and a weaker public sector budget. Average GDP across the 
EU fell by 4% (in real terms) in 2009, and the decline was 
much more dramatic in some Member States.
  Latvia has been worst hit by the financial and economic 
crisis. A small, open economy – with a population of only 
2.3  million  –  Latvia  had  been  somewhat  “overheating” 
before  suffering  a  banking  and  property  crisis.  Not 
cushioned  by  membership  to  the  euro-zone,  Latvia  has   
seen  unemployment  rise  from  6%  to  22%  in  just  over  a 
year. National income fell by 19% in 2009 alone and, as tax 
revenues dried up, the country was forced to borrow from 
the IMF and the EU.  
  Spain, for so long propelled by their construction boom, 
has seen unemployment more than double from 9% to 21% 
in  just  over  a  year.  In  the  middle  of  2007,  1.7  million 
Spaniards were looking for work; the figure is now a shocking   
4.5 million people. In Ireland, the unemployment rate reached 
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12%, up from just 4% in the previous year.  Unemployment 
levels have passed 3 million people in both Germany and 
France and are projected to do the same in the UK. Across 
the EU, the standardised unemployment rate (the definition 
of unemployed being those out of work and actively seeking 
work) has risen from about 7% to around 10%, with over   
23 million people now out of a job.
Public finances in trouble
The recession has undone 20 years of fiscal consolidation 
across  the  EU.  Public  sector  budget  deficits  are  now 
alarmingly high, easily surpassing 10% of GDP in Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and the UK. Across the EU the average annual 
budget deficit is 7% of GDP, more than double the 3% limit 
recommended  by  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP). 
Leading euro-zone Member States chose to waive the SGP 
rules when it suited them. Now the lack of budget discipline 
and control is having massive consequences for the whole 
currency area and beyond.
  Public sector (accumulated) debt levels in the EU are now 
standing at about 80% of GDP, up from about 60% in just 
two years. The UK and Ireland have seen the most dramatic 
increases in national public sector debt, in large part due to 
their exposure to the banking sector crisis and the massive 
bail-out packages for the banks. Debt levels have doubled 
for  these  countries,  rising  from  relatively  modest  levels 
(around 30% of GDP in Ireland, about 40% in the UK) to levels 
previously associated with their less prudent EU neighbours. 
For Greece, Italy (and Belgium), for many years the bad cases 
of Europe, public sector debt levels are unlikely to fall below 
100% of GDP for some time.
  The figures for the Greek public sector deficit and debt 
are striking. Greek GDP – the output they produce or the 
income they can generate in one year – stands at about 
€240 billion. Government spending in Greece is about €120 
billion per annum, maintaining the armed forces, police and 
justice  services,  public  services,  public  salaries,  pensions, 
social security and so on. On the other side of the budget 
balance, tax revenues to government do not even reach €90 
billion. This leaves a gap between spending and revenue (the 
public deficit) worth €32 billion, a staggering 14% of GDP. 
Meanwhile, the burden of interest payments on the national 
debt is set to soar. The Greek national public debt has been 
high for many years, and now stands at about €275 billion. 
It means that the Greek government has to periodically sell 
(issue and re-issue) bonds on the open market, whereby 
they borrow money for a period of time, paying (regularly) 
a competitive rate of interest to creditors, and then paying 
back  the  principal  (the  sum  borrowed)  when  a  bond 
matures.  Creditors  are  now  demanding  higher  rates  of 
return on the bonds, to reflect the risk they take. 
  Although  most  public 
sector workers are usually 
protected from the worst 
effects  of  recession  – 
keeping  their  jobs  and 
guarding  their  pension 
entitlements  –  they  too 
are  finally  sharing  some 
of  the  pain  in  some 
countries.  Latvian  civil 
servants  (indeed,  all 
public servants) have seen 
their pay halved – across 
the board. Meanwhile civil 
servants  in  Ireland  and 
Spain  have  had  to  suffer 
pay cuts, and it seems that 
public servants in Greece 
must finally pay more for 
their job security and pension benefits.
The european economic recovery plan
A series of announcements came from the Council in late 
2008,  culminating  in  the  publication  of  the  European 
Economic Recovery Plan.1 This Plan brought together the 
plans of Member States and proposed a number of measures 
to be taken at EU level. It added a little money at the EU level 
but most was to be done at the national level.
  Most  important  was  the  recommended  stimulation 
of demand in each country, by using fiscal policy to inject 
spending  power  worth  1.2%  of  GDP.  Some  taxes  were 
reduced, some elements of government spending boosted. 
Monetary policy would complement this, by keeping interest 
rates at low levels. Member States were also encouraged 
to continue with important structural reforms, consistent 
with the Lisbon Strategy: more flexibility in wage-setting 
mechanisms and the functioning of labour markets, and 
reducing  the  regulatory  and  administrative  burdens  on 
business. Green measures were to be advanced, including 
investments in green technologies, and old car scrapping 
schemes.  The  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  was  to 
increase its lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, 
while  the  European  Commission  would  bring  forward 
spending on the Trans European Networks (TENs) for energy 
supply and broadband.
State aid rules relaxed
Some  EU-wide  rules  were  relaxed.  State  aid  rules,2  for 
example,  were  relaxed  for  the  period  until  the  end  of 
2010,  using  a  temporary  framework  established  by  DG 
Competition. Measures included allowing a lump sum of 
€500,000 of aid to be paid out to any company to help 
them through difficulties encountered since the middle of 
2008.3 
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Killybegs Harbour Development, Co. Donegal, Ireland                                            © European Union, 1995-201029
The response of cohesion policy
EU  Cohesion  Policy  aims  to  reduce  the  economic 
development gap between the poorest regions and other 
regions and between the poorest communities and other 
communities  within  the  EU.  It  does  this  by  providing 
EU  co-finance  to  projects  in  the  Member  States  which 
support  investment  in  companies,  investment  in  skills 
and investment in essential infrastructure. There are three 
instruments  of  Cohesion  Policy:  two  Structural  Funds 
(the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and 
the European Social Fund (ESF)) and the Cohesion Fund. 
All  projects  which  are  co-financed  by  these  funds  are 
organised  into  Operational  Programmes.  The  priorities 
for these programmes are negotiated between Member 
States and the European Commission. The implementation 
of  the  programmes  is  managed  by  the  Member  States 
over a planning period of about seven years, called the 
programming period.
  Cohesion Policy has had a central role in the EU response 
to the economic crisis. Measures were first proposed in the 
Commission  communication  “Cohesion  Policy:  investing 
in the real economy”,4 followed by a series of amending 
regulations. The key amending regulations are listed in Table 1 
and the substance of them is described below.
Extending the 2000-2006 Operational Programmes
An important measure taken by the European Commission 
was  to  give  Member  States  the  possibility  of  extending 
the  life  of  Operational  Programmes  from  the  2000-2006 
programming  period.5  Structural  Funds  programmes  from 
this  period  would  normally  be  allowed  to  spend  up  until 
the end of 2008, with a series of winding-up reports being 
submitted to the Commission within a deadline of 15 months, 
by 31 March 2010. Under the extension scheme, spending 
could continue for an extra six months, until the end of June 
2009, and the reports could be submitted by 30 September 
2010 (and for some specific programmes even later).
  In fact, of the €257 billion available to all programmes 
(and Cohesion Fund projects) for the 2000-2006 period, 
about €225 billion (87%) had been paid out by the end 
of 2008.  With about two-thirds of all Programmes taking 
advantage  of  this  extension  (385  out  of  a  total  of  555 
programmes), it is expected that virtually the whole budget 
will now be spent.  
Advances to the 2007-2013 Operational Programmes
For the current programming period, the most significant 
change made by the European Commission was to increase 
the  level  of  advances  (or  pre-payments)  to  Operational 
Programmes. From a total budget of €347 billion over seven 
years,  the  Commission  had  planned  to  hand  out  about   
€23 billion in advances to programmes over the first three 
years.  But for 2009, an extra €6.25 billion was advanced to 
Member States, on top of the €5 billion already advanced 
that year.6 Added to the €18 billion of advances made in 
2007 and 2008, this means that nearly €30 has now been 
advanced to programmes – more than 8% of all funds.
  The latest amending regulation of 24 June 20107 further 
increases the advances to Member States which currently 
have cash flow problems or have seen GDP fall by more 
than 10% in 2009: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and 
Romania. This will be done by advancing a further 4% of 
ESF funds, and an additional 2% of the Cohesion Fund (see 
Table 2).
  All these monies are hugely important for kick-starting 
projects  and  programmes  in  many  Member  States, 
especially at a time when Government finances are being 
squeezed. The  advances  also  have  the  added  advantage 
of  being  treated  as  expenditure  (and  payments  made  to 
programmes)  for  the  purposes  of  the  n+2  or  n+3  rule.   
This  rule  dictates  that  EU  funds  to  programmes  are 
automatically  decommitted  (taken  back  by  the  EU)  if 
not  spent  within  two  or  three  years  of  their  scheduled 
(automatic) commitment.
EIPASCOPE 2010/2
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Table 1: Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund amending regulations, 2008-2010
Date Regulation number
18 December 2008 Council Regulation (EC) 1341/2008, amending Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 (General Regulation 
for Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund)
7 April 2009 Council Regulation (EC) 284/2009, amending Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 (General Regulation) 
6 May 2009 Regulation (EC) 396/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation 
(EC) 1081/2006 (European Social Fund)
6 May 2009 Regulation (EC) 397/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation 
(EC) 1080/2006 (European Regional Development Fund)
1 September 2009 Commission Regulation (EC) 846/2009, amending Commission Regulation (EC) 1828/2006 
(implementing regulation)
19 May 2010 Regulation (EU) 437/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation 
(EC) 1080/2006 (ERDF)
16 June 2010 Regulation (EU) 539/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Council 
Regulation 1083/2006
Table 2
ESF additional 
advance (4%); 
in € million
Cohesion Fund 
additional 
advance (2%); 
in € million
Total advance; 
in € million
Estonia 15.7 23.0 38.7
Latvia 22.0 30.8 52.8
Lithuania 41.1 46.1 87.2
Hungary 145.2 172.8 318.0
Romania 147.4 131.0 278.4
Total 371.3 403.8 775.230
www.eipa.eu
Relaxing the rules on spending the 2007 commitment
Although  the  2007-2013  programming  period  was  well 
advanced in terms of planning and proposals – compared 
to  previous  programming  periods  –  programmes  rarely 
started in full flow at the beginning of January 2007. Even 
where  programmes  were  agreed  upon  in  early  2007, 
expenditure in the early months is slow, putting even more 
pressure on programmes to perform in subsequent years, 
in order to avoid the loss of funds through the n+2/3 rule. 
For this reason, the new 2010 amending regulation has also 
completely changed the nature of the 2007 commitment by 
removing the n+2 period (for EU15, less Greece and Portugal) 
and n+3 period (for EU12 plus Greece and Portugal).8 Thus, 
the 2007 commitment is now available across the whole 
programming period. More precisely, the 2007 commitment 
has been split into six equal parts and each sixth added to 
the  individual  annual  commitments  of  2008,  2009,  2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013. The decommitment rule now applies only 
to the six other annual commitments, each of which has 
been supplemented by the sixth from 2007.
Implementing major projects
Major  projects  were  defined  in  the  Structural  Funds 
regulations as being those with a total cost of over €50 million 
(for  example,  transport  or  energy  infrastructure),  or  over   
€30 million for environmental projects (usually construction 
of  water  supply  facilities,  waste  water  collection  and 
treatment, solid waste treatment). After the 2010 amending 
regulation, the major project definition now only includes 
projects which cost in excess of €50 million, whether they 
are environmental infrastructure projects or not.9 
  Major  projects  have  the  special  status  of  requiring 
Member States to conduct a (ex ante) Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(CBA), reporting the results on a specific application form, 
submitting this to the European Commission, and having 
this  approved  or  agreed  by  the  Commission  services. 
With  a  higher  threshold  for  environmental  projects,  the 
administrative  burden  on  Member  States  is  apparently 
reduced.  That  said,  Member  States  would  still  be  well 
advised to conduct the CBA in order to demonstrate the 
positive socio-economic value of the project to the regional 
and national economies.
  Under one of the 2009 amending regulations,10 Member 
States no longer need to wait for Commission approval to 
start  spending  on  major  projects. This  can  speed  up  the 
implementation process significantly. Major projects, as with 
all big projects, can often encounter long delays – usually 
caused  by  the  need  for  careful  coordination,  the  need 
for  feasibility  studies,  environmental  impact  assessments 
(EIA), CBAs, and the need for land acquisition and planning 
approvals. These steps cannot ultimately be avoided, but 
cutting  out  the  administrative  waiting  time  for  approval 
from the Commission should be an advantage and should 
assist the spending profiles of infrastructure programmes.
  The  amending  Commission  Regulation  846/2009 
now  also  allows  Member  States  to  submit  expenditure 
statements  (and  payment  claims)  based  on  expenditure 
incurred  for  major  projects,  before  the  Commission  has 
formally accepted the project.
  Of course, it is expected that the preparatory steps and 
ex ante analyses are eventually completed in a satisfactory 
manner and the Commission does reserve the right to refuse 
the co-financing of a major project. In such a case, where 
agreement  through  negotiation  cannot  be  reached,  the 
Member  State  would  be  obliged  to  finance  100%  of  the 
project from national funds (public or private).
  Another  change  for  major  projects  has  also  been 
introduced in 2010. Under the new rules, one major national 
infrastructure  project  (such  as  a  new  national  motorway 
or an energy network crossing many regions) can now be 
funded  from  different  Operational  Programmes  (typically 
different  regional  programmes).11  Previously,  the  overall 
major project would have to have been split into different 
projects,  each  to  be  accommodated  within  a  different 
Operational Programme.
  Lastly,  where  a  programme  is  facing  an  automatic 
decommitment of part of any commitment (that part not 
spent), under the n+2 or n+3 rule, the decommitment will 
now be reduced by an amount equal to the total budgets 
of  major  projects  which  are  still  being  assessed  by  the 
European  Commission.12  This  is  on  the  condition  that 
the  major  projects’  application  forms  have  already  been 
submitted by the Member States according to the required 
standards.
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Figure 1: pre-amendment – payments to avoid n+2/3 losses
Source: European Commission
Figure 2: post-amendment – payments to avoid n+2/3 losses
Source: European Commission
For EU12, n+3 operates for commitments from 2007 to 2010, 
and  n+2  operates  from  2011  to  2013.    The  different  colours 
represent years of commitment, for example, green is 2010, grey 
is 2011. Their positioning represents the year by which funds 
must be spent under the n+3 and n+2 rule, for example, the 2011 
commitment must be spent by the end of 2013. The advances 
use up the 2007 commitment in Figure 1; in Figure 2, the 2007 
commitment is red, to be used up by the relevant years.31
Expanding the JASPERS facility
Besides  these  simplifications  of  the  rules,  the  technical 
assistance  facility  JASPERS  is  being  expanded  by  25%. 
This initiative (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in the 
European Regions) is provided by the European Commission 
in conjunction with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(EBRD), and is designed to provide 
specialist  help  to  (the  EU12) 
Member  States  as  they  try  to 
implement  large  infrastructure 
projects.13  The  expansion  of 
this  resource  means  that  more 
experts  are  available  to  be 
employed temporarily alongside 
Member  State  officials,  in  order 
to  help  them  get  through  the 
planning processes, to complete 
the technical feasibility and environmental impact studies, 
to conduct the cost-benefit analysis, and to manage and 
execute  the  project  in  the  most  efficient  and  effective 
manner.  
Revenue-generating projects
For  the  2007-2013  programming  period  new  rules  were 
introduced in order to eliminate the excessive draw-down 
of  EU  funds  in  cases  where  co-financed  infrastructure 
yields  a  revenue  stream  to  project  developers. These  are 
called  the  Article  55  rules  (relating  to  Article  55  of  the 
General Regulation for Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, 
Regulation (EC) 1083/2006). Examples of projects covered 
by these rules include the construction of roads or bridges 
which  have  pay-tolls;  the  construction  of  business  parks, 
where rent will be paid by companies using business space; 
and tourism sites which charge visitors. However, the rules 
apply  to  all  co-financed  projects  which  provide  services 
(or where land has been sold) against payment. Notably, 
Structural Funds grants to businesses – designed to improve 
business performance – are not covered by the Article 55 
rules, nor are loans to businesses, where loans are paid back 
to the lending body.
  The earliest measure of simplification of the regulations 
took  place  in  December  2008,  when  the  threshold  for 
revenue-generating projects was raised from €200,000 to   
€1  million.14  Only  ERDF  and  Cohesion  Fund  co-finance 
projects with a total cost over €1 million are now liable to 
follow the rules, with ESF projects now being completely 
excluded.
  Where the project is above the threshold, Member State 
authorities  have  to  make  precise  estimates  of  all  future 
capital and operating costs and all future revenue streams, 
and  use  a  discounted  cash  flow  analysis  to  calculate  the 
funding gap and minimum grant 
requirement.  Under  the  original 
rules, on completion of the capital 
investment  phase  of  the  project, 
actual  revenue  streams  were 
to  be  monitored  for  three  years 
beyond  the  formal  closure  of  an 
Operational  Programme  (which 
can be four years after the end of 
the  programming  period  2007-
2013). In the event that revenues 
were greatly in excess of the estimate, a refund was to be paid 
back to the EU. Before the threshold was raised to €1 million, 
even  the  smallest  revenue-generating  projects  had  been 
bound  to  monitor  revenue  streams  with  a  proportionate 
effort.
  An amendment has now been made,15 cutting the period 
for  monitoring  revenue  streams.  They  now  need  to  be 
monitored up until the submission of closure documents of 
an Operational Programme, that is to say, 31 March 2017 (i.e. 
15 months after the final date for eligibility of expenditure 
(31  December  2015)).  Any  excess  revenue  should  be 
deducted from the (interim or final) payment claims made 
to  the  Commission.  If  programmes  wish  to  re-use  any 
funds repaid to the EU, deductions will need to be made in 
payment  claims  before 
the  final  date  of  eligible 
expenditure.  Significantly, 
this change has not been 
made  in  response  to  the 
economic  crisis.  Rather, 
it  has  arrived  after  much 
lobbying  from  Member 
States,  who  argued  that 
the  administrative  burden 
of  monitoring  revenues 
for so long was excessive. 
Programmes  would  also 
have lost the funds repaid.
  For  projects  where 
revenues  cannot  be 
estimated  in  advance 
(for  certain  categories 
of  project,  such  as  high-
tech  research  and  innovation  centres),  any  net  revenue 
generated within five years of completion of the project shall 
be deducted from expenditure declared to the Commission.   
If projects are completed more than five years before closure 
of a programme, the monitoring can be stopped after five 
years.
Assuming flat rate costs
Best  known  amongst  the  simplification  measures  taken 
by  the  European  Commission  is  the  introduction  of  a 
“flat rate” eligible cost procedure. The relevant amending 
regulations relate to both ESF 16 and ERDF.17 So as to avoid 
the complications and difficulties in estimating the value of 
EIPASCOPE 2010/2
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For revenue-generating projects, 
the period for monitoring 
revenue streams has been cut .... 
Member States argued that the 
administrative burden of monitoring 
revenues for so long was excessive.
New motorway, Comunidad Valenciana, Spain. Co-financed by ERDF.             © European Union, 1995-201032
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indirect costs of projects, or the huge administrative burden 
of  always  calculating  detailed  exact  costs  for  relatively 
modest standard activities, the Commission has decided to 
allow the submission of “flat rate” assumptions, as long as 
the assumptions are justified and presented in advance of 
their widespread application.  
  There are three specific “flat rate” cases described now in 
the regulations. The first is the case of “overheads” or regular 
indirect costs involved in executing a particular project (for 
example,  heating,  lighting,  waste  disposal,  telephones, 
photocopying,  shared  facilities  etc).  Where  justified,  these 
may now be declared on a standardised basis, up to 20% 
of the direct costs of an operation. The second case is by 
applying a standard scale of unit cost. Good examples are in 
the field of training, for example, assuming that the average 
cost of putting a trainee through a particular type of training 
course is x 000 or y 000 euro; or for a piece of equipment, 
such as a basic computer terminal. The third case is the lump 
sum flat rate, whereby the lump sum can cover all or part 
of the costs of an operation. A typical example: the average 
cost of a particular type of event is calculated at €30,000, and 
this figure will be assumed as the flat rate cost for all such 
future events.
  Application  of  the  new  flat  rate  methods  is  strictly 
prohibited  from  operations  which  have  a  public 
procurement  procedure.  That  is  to  say,  no  contractor  or 
contracting authority may work with flat rate assumptions 
within tender documents or within billing/payment claims 
during an operation. 
Greener housing and housing promoting social cohesion 
Further boosting the green credentials of Cohesion Policy 
has  been  an  amending  regulation  relating  to  the  use  of 
ERDF for the improvement of housing. In the original ERDF 
regulation,  up  to  3%  of  spending  within  an  Operational 
Programme (or up to 2% of the Member States’ ERDF budget) 
could be used by the new Member States (EU12) to invest in 
the improvement of certain sections of the housing stock. 
This is primarily housing in urban areas which are at risk of 
serious physical deterioration and social exclusion. Selected 
areas had to be determined according to the benchmarks 
defined for a list of criteria. This regulation was designed to 
contribute to the vast cost associated with the upgrading of 
the concrete blocks of flats built under Communism.
  Under the amending regulation,18 this spending in EU12 
can  continue,  but  an  additional  4%  of  ERDF  can  also  be 
spent on energy efficiency improvements and on the use 
of renewable energy in this housing stock. Moreover, this 
new  measure  also  applies  to  EU15  Member  States,  with 
the condition that social cohesion is supported. This is the 
first  time  that  Structural  Funds  have  been  dedicated  to 
upgrading housing.
  Further advances in the field of housing expenditure have 
been made as a result of a separate amending regulation.19 
Previously, the housing expenditures described above had 
to  be  included  within  an  integrated  urban  development 
initiative. The amendment means that this expenditure can 
now also be made in rural areas, where many of the problems 
to be addressed do exist. The interventions should not be 
restricted to housing in these rural areas, but should be part 
of  an  integrated  approach  for  marginalised  communities 
(e.g.  Roma  communities),  to  cover  actions  in  the  field  of 
education, health care, employment and social support and 
inclusion. For these communities, new housing can now also 
be supported.
Financial engineering
Member States are increasingly encouraged to use financial 
engineering techniques within their programme operations, 
that is, bringing in private sector finance, experience and 
methods  to  supplement  public  sector  funding  and  the 
traditional intervention method of grants to projects and 
businesses.  Examples  include  standard  loan  mechanisms, 
the establishment of venture capital or risk capital schemes, 
the use of public-private partnerships (PPP), loan guarantee 
schemes, and so on.
  Financial  engineering  instruments  can  be  notoriously 
complicated and frequently require good advance planning 
and specialist management teams. One particular Structural 
Funds operational challenge to date has been the treatment 
of  the  management  costs  and  fees. The  2010  amending 
regulation addresses this by allowing management fees, in 
addition to management costs, to be considered as eligible 
expenditure.20
  The new amending regulation also allows Member States 
to establish new, specialist financial engineering instruments 
for enabling operations in the field of energy efficiency and 
the use of renewable energies in housing.21 
Other simplifications
Despite the financial crisis, fewer than half of the Member 
States have wanted to revise any Operational Programmes 
to  date.  This  is  good  news  for  managing  authorities  and 
the  European  Commission,  as  revisions  frequently  require 
an  evaluation  study  and  significant  negotiation  between 
Member  State  and  the  Commission,  and  always  require  a 
formal Commission Decision. Programme revisions are very 
time consuming. The 2010 amending regulation now allows 
Member States to justify revisions with an analysis of rationale 
and expected impact, rather than a full evaluation.22 
  One modest change introduced by the latest amending 
regulation  is  to  simplify  the  requirements  on  reporting 
financial information in the Annual Implementation Report 
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for each Operational Programme. Member State authorities 
will now only be required to report the same information 
as that recorded in expenditure statements and payment 
claims (made regularly to the European Commission), and 
not to report a raft of financial indicators as before.23 
  Projects are normally required to be operational for at 
least five years (in some cases just three years) after their 
completion, in order for all project expenditures to remain 
eligible. With the new amending regulation, this “durability” 
requirement  has  been  clarified.  In  those  cases  where 
bankruptcy of a company has led to a project not enduring, 
the project will not be subject to the “durability” rule.24 
  The  possibility  of  partial  closure  of  Operational 
Programmes  was  introduced  for 
the new programming period. The 
aim was to allow Member States 
and the Commission to “wrap up” 
completed  parts  of  Operational 
Programmes  –  where  feasible  – 
and reduce the significant burdens 
of  big-bang  closures.  However, 
the danger of doing this was that 
auditors  might  then  have  found 
some  irregularities  in  the  closed  part  of  the  programme.     
As this would have lead to a correction made retrospectively, 
the  funds  involved  would  have  then  been  lost  to  the 
programme  budget  forever,  even  though  the  rest  of  the 
programme  was  still  open. The  amending  regulation  now 
allows any such corrections to be re-used, as long as it is the 
Member State who makes the correction.25 
  Lastly,  the  amending  Commission  Regulation  of  23 
September 2009 (846/2009) aligned and clarified a number 
of provisions. Some publicity and information requirements 
were simplified, the amount of information requested on 
certified expenditure statements was reduced and a number 
of forms (for submission to the Commission) were modified.
Progress on the ground
During  2010,  Member  States  reported  on  the  progress 
of Structural Funds operations on the ground within the 
context of their Strategic Reporting exercise.26 We know that 
at the end of 2009, 27% of the €350 billion Cohesion Policy 
budget had been allocated to projects which had already 
been approved. (Actual payments levels are much lower). For 
some Member States (e.g. Netherlands, Belgium), the figures 
are  much  higher,  with  over  50%  of  their  budgets  being 
allocated to projects which have already been approved. 
For others, the figures are worryingly low, little over 10% 
for Greece and Romania.  Examining progress by field of 
activity reveals that grants to SMEs are moving ahead rather 
well, while spending approved for infrastructure projects is 
progressing steadily. Approvals of projects are taking place 
at  a  lower  rate  for  energy  supply  networks,  broadband 
networks and capacity-building within administrations.
Cohesion policy playing its part?
Cohesion Policy has been at the heart of the EU response 
to the economic crisis. It has shown itself to be responsive 
and flexible. Member States and the European Commission 
have  worked  together  and  a  raft  of  new  amending 
regulations have come into force between 2008 and 2010. 
As  a  result,  spending  periods  have  been  prolonged  and 
additional  financial  advances  have  been  made,  enabling 
many Member States to complete programmes and initiate 
new programmes and projects. It has simplified a number 
of  rules  and  reduced  the  burden  of  some  administrative 
and financial control tasks. It is adapting to new needs and 
challenges.   
A focus on investment
Of course the scale of the contribution of Cohesion Policy 
– in responding to the economic crisis – is modest when 
compared to the massive fiscal injections made by Member 
States  themselves.  But  Cohesion  activities  do  have  a 
particular quality – they focus on investment, on creating 
a successful economic base, and 
not  on  consumption.  Cohesion 
activities  co-finance  investment 
in  essential  infrastructure, 
investment in ongoing and new 
businesses, and investment in the 
local people – developing the skills 
that  businesses  need  to  thrive 
in  a  global  economy.  Cohesion 
Policy does use taxpayers’ money, 
but is not there to bail out struggling sectors or to provide 
handouts for the poorest. It is there to help disadvantaged 
regions and communities to help themselves.
A highly visible policy
For EU citizens, it is probably the most visible of EU policies, 
understood  to  produce  tangible  benefits  in  many  ways. 
Many call for the policy to be repatriated, and let the Member 
States get on with their own economic development work, 
in  some  cases  with  the  help  of  EU  funds. Yet  the  added 
value of the policy at the EU level is significant: it provides 
a planning discipline and cycle largely protected from the 
whims of national political cycles; it guarantees investment 
finance  over  a  medium-term  perspective;  it  enables   
EU-wide priorities to be pursued, including transnational, 
cross-border and interregional projects and interests; and it 
facilitates an enormous exchange of experience and good 
practice. Moreover, much of the investment in the poorer 
regions is ultimately of great benefit to the wealthier regions.
Providing a positive return on investment 
Like  all  elements  of  public  spending  –  even  capital 
investments – Cohesion activities will no doubt have to suffer 
their share of the impending cuts. What the champions of this 
policy need to remind the decision-makers of is that projects 
co-financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund 
are designed to provide a positive socio-economic return, 
and be of net benefit for all project stakeholders and the 
wider  community  and  economy.  They  are  designed  to 
deliver value-for-money to the taxpayer. This surely stands 
in  sharp  contrast  to  the  multitude  of  expenditures  that 
should come under close scrutiny, following the financial 
mismanagement of recent years. The underperforming and 
wasteful elements of public administrations, the liabilities 
of non-funded public sector defined benefit (final salary) 
pension  schemes,  unjustified  early  retirement  ages  and 
packages, tax evasion, welfare schemes which do not reward 
finding work, and – lest we forget – the massive emergency 
funding directed to the financial sector. 
Cohesion Policy does use 
taxpayers’ money, but is not there 
to bail out struggling sectors 
or to provide handouts 
for the poorest.34
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